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Li linguistics, the old taxonomic grammar views languages as 
consisting ofthe utterances of speakers[l]. The grammarians ofthis camp 
take thejob of classification of strings of sounds or marks into grammatical 
categories as their main task. For them, no underlying thing of language 
should be considered and the result of classification is sufficient for 
grammatical purpose. However, Noam Chomsky revolutionized linguistics 
by introducing a new conception of grammar the transformational 
grammar. He holds that languages consist of a surface as well as a deep 
structure. The surface structure is what the taxonomic linguists concem 
about, while the deep structure is behind the scene. Where does it hind? It 
cannot be directly observed, at least at this moment. But，according to 
Chomsky, its existence can be revealed by consideration of some linguistic 
phenomena which are difficult, if not impossible, to be explained if the 
existence of deep structure is not postulated. So he takes the methodology of 
linguistics the same as that of other typical empirical sciences like physics 
and chemistry, namely, the Hypothetico-Deductive method. Deep structure 
is postulated in transformational grammar and the confirmation of its 
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existence is achieved by the agreement of the prediction of this grammar and 
the observable linguistic phenomena. 
This is the picture of theoretical linguistics that Chomsky draws, 
whose work mainly concerns the syntactic part of linguistics. J. J. Katz 
followed Chomsky's way to investigate the semantic part. Thus came the 
semantic theory ofKatz that we will concem about. Li one ofhis books, Katz 
wrote, 
“ the case of the atomic theory is a sound paradigm for linguistic 
theory. Thus, we shall argue that natural languages have an underlying 
reality very different from their surface form. We shall try to show that this 
underlying reality can be discovered and substantiated by essentially the 
same method of hypothetical postulation and empirical verification that 
established the explanatory superiority of the atomic theory."[2] 
This quotation partly explains the motivation behind my thesis. Under 
this conception of language, Katz is justified to take atomic theory as a 
paradigm for linguistic theory, for physical theory is paradigmatic for 
utilizing the Hypothetico-Deductive method. But this immediately raises the 
question ofwhether or not Katz, semantic theory agrees well enough with its 
paradigm so as to ensure that its result is fruitful. I set my task to examine this 
question. It should, however, be noted that my concem is mainly with broad 
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methodological issues rather than with detailed formulation. Let me roughly 
foretell the result of my study: Katzian semantics suffers from severe 
methodological problems which make it a long way from its paradigm. 
I want to express my deep gratitude to my supervisor. Dr. Lee Tien-
Ming, for his substantial guidance and insight-provoking advice. I have also 
leamt a lot from reading his doctoral dissertation. 
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1. Underlying Linguistic Reality[3] 
Chomsky developed the theory of transformational grammar in the 
syntactic aspect while Katz followed in the semantic level; Katzian semantic 
theory makes heavy use of the notions developed in Chomskian theory. 
Before presenting the semantic theory, it is necessary to present the syntactic 
theory first. 
Chomsky's position in syntactics was chiefly developed in Syntactic 
Structures[4] mdAspects of the Theory ofSyntax[5]. Nevertheless, since I 
take the position ofKatz on transformational grammar as my object ofstudy, 
the syntactics presented here is what Katz took it to be. The chief writings of 
Katz on which my study is based range from the 60's till the early 70,s. 
Whether his later position is still consistent with his former one does not 
concem me here. The justification for this selection is that the ideas ofKatz 
during the mentioned period had provoked a lot of interest and attention. 
Hence they are important at least from the historical point of view, whether 
or not they are still influential nowadays. 
The criticisms or comments on Katzian semantics were usually 
directed to examining its detailed formulation from a linguistic point of 
view.[6] For instance, scholars examined the adequacy of using the 
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projection rules[7] to produce suitable semantic interpretation for complex 
constituents ofsentences or the adequacy of using semantic markers to act as 
the means for semantic representation. On the other hand, my focus is on the 
supposed scientific methodology involved in Katzian semantics. 
1.1 Syntactics 
A transformational grammar consists of three components: syntactic, 
semantic and phonological components. The syntactic component is the 
generative source of the whole grammar. Its outputs are the inputs for the 
other two units. These two units provide semantic and phonetic 
interpretations for the inputs separately. 
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1.1.1 Superficial & Underlying Phrase Markers 
For both the surface and deep structures of sentences, tree diagrams 
called phrase markers are used to indicate the syntactic structure. Those for 
surface structure are called superficial phrase markers and those for deep 
structure, underlying phrase markers. For example[8], the surface structure 
of a sentence may be marked as follows: 
S 
(11) ^ ^ ^ \ 
NP VP A / \ 
Adj N V NP A 
Art Adj N 
I丨\ 
invisible God created the visible world 
where the symbols “S”，"NP", "Adj",…,.etc. stand for “sentence，’，"noun 
phrase", "adjective",..... etc., respectively. They are used to indicate the 
syntactic categories to which the constituents of the sentence belong. For 
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instance, "invisible" is an adjective, “God，，is a noun and "invisible God’， 
constitutes a noun phrase. It should be remarked that what constitutes the 
surface structure of a sentence should include both the information of the 
syntactic structure and the lexical items that constitute the sentence. Similar 
remark holds for deep structure. 
Corresponding to this surface structure, there is one, but not 
necessarily only one, deep structure marked by the following underlying 
phrase marker[9]: 
S 
(1.2) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ \ 
NP VP 
八 ^ \ 
NP S V NP 八 八 
NP VP NP S 
八 A 八 
Copula Adj NP VP l \ A 
/ / Copula Adj 
God God is invisible created the world the world is visible 9 
The introduction of the deep structure is due, among other things，to 
the observation that some sentences with different surface structures have 
the same meaning, while some others with the same surface structure have 
different meanings. Let's look at some examples: 
(1.3) hivisible God created the visible world. 
(1.4) God who is invisible created the world which is visible. 
Sentence (1.4) has the following surface structure[10]: 
S 
(1.5) ^ ^ ^ ^ \ 
NP VP 
A 八 
NP S V NP 
1八 八 
NP VP NP S 丨八 /1八 
Copula Adj / NP VP 
/ 八 
/ Copula Adj 
1 / I 
God who is invisible created the world which is visible 
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Thus, (1.3) and (1.4) have different surface structures but are synonymous. 
On the other hand, consider the following sentences: 
(1.6) John is easy to leave. 
(1.7) John is eager to leave. 
Both can be marked as[l 1]: 
S 
(1.8) ^ / ^ ^ ^ \ ^ 
NP VP I A \ 
N Copula Pred A 
Adj VP 
John is easy/ eager to leave 
So, (1.6) and (1.7) receive the same surface description. However, as 
remarked by Katz[12], it is apparent to any fluent speaker of English that 
there is an important syntactic difference between (1.6) and (1.7) which the 
above phrase marker does not reflect. Li (1.6) "John" is the object of the 
verb “leave，，, while in (1.7) “John” is the subject. 
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The above observation indicates that some linguistic facts are difficult 
to be explained if only surface structure is taken into account. The resolution 
in transformational grammar is by postulating the same underlying phrase 
marker (1.2) corresponding to both (1.3) and (1.4). Furthermore, in 
transformational grammar, underlying phrase markers are responsible for 
semantic interpretation and therefore (1.3) and (1.4) receive the same 
semantic interpretation. On the other hand, (1.6) and (1.7) have the 
following underlying phrase markers respectively[13]: 
S 
(1.9) ^ ^ " \ 
NP VP 
八 八 
N S Copula Adj 
八 K 
NP VP NP 
I八 卜 
N V NP NP 
N 
it one leaves John is easy for one 
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s 
(1.10) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " ^ ^ ^ \ 
NP VP I ^ ^ 
N Copula Adj Prep-Phrase 
卜 
/ NP I K 
Prep / S 
/ 八 
N NP VP 
V 
John is eager for it John leaves 
As Katz noted[14], “the grammatical relations subject-of-sentence， 
subject'Of'Verb, predicate-of-sentence，direct-object-of-verb, etc., are 
defined in terms of configurations of symbols in phrase markers, ln 
transformational theory，their definitions are restricted to configurations of 
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symbols in underlying phrase markers." The restriction on definitions stated 
in this quotation is imposed to avoid such problems as are posed by cases 
like (1.6) and (1.7). So with certain such suitable definitions, the difference 
between (1.9) and (1.10) can account for the discrepancy between (1.6) and 
(1.7) as mentioned. 
In view of the above observations, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
surface structure does not suffice to represent the logical form ofsentences. 
Thus comes the deep structure. Katz held that the logical form of sentences 
is totally represented in deep structure and none in surface structure. For 
him, surface structure is responsible for phonetic interpretation only. 
1.1.2 Rewriting & Transformational Rules 
The syntactic component consists of two kinds of rules. One is called 
rewriting rules or phrase structure rules, the other is called 
transformational rules. Rewriting rules are used for generating the infinite 
number of underlying phrase markers for sentences. The generation starts 
from an initial symbol "S" which stands for “sentence” and then the 
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rewriting rules are used to replace the symbols step by step, for example, the 
foUowing three rules can be taken as an illustration[15]: 
(1.11) (i) S——>AB 
(ii) A ——-> cd 
(iii) B -----> ef 












However，they both have the following phrase marker: 
S 
(1.14) y ^ 
A B 
八八 
c d e f 
So these two derivations are regarded as equivalent derivations of "cdef' 
with respect to the rules (1 • 11). 
hi rules (1 • 11), the upper case letters can be interpreted as standing for 
the syntactic categories and the lower case letters for the morpheme ofthe 
language. For example, “A’，is interpreted as standing for noun phrase, "B" 
for verb phrase, “c” for the morpheme the, “d，，for child, “e” for enjoys, and 
T for cookies. Then "cdef' would become “The child enjoys cookies” and 
(1.14) becomes 
S 
(1.15) ^ / ^ " ^ ^ X ^ 
NP VP 
八 八 
the child enjoys cookies 
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which isjust like the phrase marker introduced before. A crucial point should 
be remarked here is that such derivations by rewriting rules are used for 
generating underlying phrase markers but not for superficial ones. An 
example for generating (1.2) is as follows[16]: 
(1.16) (R1) S -——> NP Pred-Phrase 
(R2) Pred-Phrase ---—> Aux VP (Place) (Time) 
.Copula Pred 
(R3) VP ——> ( V I (NP) (Prep-Phrase) (Prep-Phrase) (Mamer) . \ 
\\r // 
(R4) NP ——> (Art) N (S) 
/ Adjective \ 
\ 
(R5) Pred -----> ) 
\ (like) Pred-Nominal / 
(R6) Aux -----> Tense QA) (Aspect) 
(R7) V ―…> CS 
(R8) N …―> CS 
(R9) Adjective — > CS 
(R10)Art——>CS 
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LEXICON [the [+Art, +Def,…“]] 
[God [+N, +Count，…"]] 
[create [+V, +—NP,…“]] 
[visible [+Adjective,..…]] 
[invisible [+Adjective,..…]] 
where a string of symbols in a derivation that contains only symbols occuring 
in the rules (R1) to (R10) and that cannot be further rewritten by these rules 
is called a preterminal string. A terminal string can be obtained from a 
preterminal string by inserting a lexical entry in accord with the lexical 
substitution rule: 
(1.17) ff CS is a complex symbol of a preterminal string and [D [C]] is a 
lexicon entry, then CS can be replaced by D just in case C is not 
distinct from CS. 
After an underlying phrase marker has been generated, the other type 
of rules——the transformational rules, are applied to convert it into its 
corresponding superficial phrase marker(s)[17]: 
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(1.18) (R1) X — NP1 — NP2 …Copuk …A …Y ===> X …NP1 — 
whp^2] — Copula 一一- A — Y, where NP1 = NP2 
OR2) X — wh[D [+N, +Animate,"…]]—Y ===> X — who …Y 
(R3) X …wh[D [+N, -Animate,"..]]…Y ===> X …which — Y 
(R4) X — NP — {who/ which} — Copula — A — Y = = > 
X — (Art) A N — Y, where NP dominates (Art) and N 
(1.18) can be applied to (1.2) because the string of terminal symbols in (1.2) 
can be analyzed as an instance of the schema to the left of the double arrow 
in (1.18)(R1). But since this string in (1.2) can be analyzed in two ways as an 
instance of this schema, i.e., either as 
God God is invisible ed create the world the world is visible 
X NP1 NP2 Cp A Y 
or as 
God God is invisible ed create the world the world is visible 
X NP1 NP2 Cp A Y 
(1.18)(R1) can be applied twice to (1.2) to yield a derived phrase marker 
which, by applying (1.18)(R2) and (R3), becomes (1.5) which, it will be 
recalled, is the superficial phrase marker for (1.4). Now, (1.18)QR4) deletes 
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the relative pronouns and permutes the adjective in front ofthe noun, i.e., 
between the noun and the article if there is one. This gives the superficial 
phrase marker (1.1) for (1.3). Consequently, (1.3) and (1.4) have the same 
underlying phrase marker, which means that the grammar predicts that they 
are paraphrases, for since they have the same underlying phrase marker, they 
must receive the same semantic interpretation in the semantic component. 
On the other hand, the different superficial phrase markers (1.1) and (1.5) 
are transferred to the phonological component in which they receive 
different phonetic interpretations. 
In summary，the whole situation may be represented diagrammatically 
as follows: 
(1 19) Syntactic component 
Semantic Component for UPM Rewriting 
Semantic Merpretation ^ Rules 
UPM 
N/ 
Phonological Component for SPM Transformational 
Phonetic Merpretation ^ Rules 
where UPM: Underlying Phrase Marker 
SPM: Superficial Phrase Marker 
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1.2 Semantics 
As indicated above, semantic component receives underlying phrase 
markers for semantic interpretation. It makes use of the principle of 
compositionality of semantics which says that the meaning ofa syntactically 
complex constituent, from words to sentences, is a compositional function of 
the meanings of its parts. So the most crucial things that we should leam 
about Katzian semantics are the way by which the meanings of syntactically 
simple constituents are represented and the compositional principle by 
which meanings are combined. 
1.2.1 Semantic Markers, Readings & Projection Rules 
to Katzian semantics, senses of lexical items (syntactically minimal 
units) are analyzed as composed of atomic concepts. Each atomic concept is 
referred to by a single symbol called primitive semantic marker. Hence, the 
semantic representation of senses, both of lexical items and syntactically 
complex constituents, will be composed of a configuration of primitive 
semantic markers. These primitive semantic markers, together with 
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representations of concepts defined in terms of them will be referred to as 
semantic markers. At this point，Katz remarked: 
"We cannot be expected to set forth the primitive semantic markers in 
the way that a logician sets forth the primitives of a formalized 
language We eventually hope to reach the semantic simples ofnatural 
language，by making semantic representation richer and richer in structure, 
so that it can explain the semantic properties and relations ofmore and more 
sentences. But，for the time being, we have to present the semantic 
representations of lexical items in terms of semantic markers. Li doing so， 
however, we make no assumption about the final status of these semantic 
markers in the vocabulary of semantic theory."[18] 
As an example, one sense of the word "bachelor" might be 
represented by the set of semantic markers: (Object), (Physical), ^Human), 
(Adult), OV[ale) and ^sfot married). That is, this sense might be analyzed as 
composed of ‘atomic’ concepts such as the concepts of being an object, 
being physical, being a human, etc.. This sense of “bachelor” is just the 
paraphrase of "unmarried man". 
A reading of a constituent is a set of semantic markers which acts as 
the semantic representation of a sense of this constituent. There are lexical 
readings and derived readings. The former ones are for semantic 
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representation of lexical items, while the latter ones are derived from the 
former ones as well as the compositional rules. Since there are only finitely 
many lexical items in the grammar, we can list an appropriate set of lexical 
readings for each lexical item that occurs in the lexicon component of the 
syntactic component (see (1.16), (1.17)). We refer to such a mapping of 
lexical readings onto lexical items as a dictionary. 
The readings for syntactically complex constituents like sentences 
cannot be listed one by one as can be for lexical items since sentences are 
infinite in number. Li a semantic component, compositional rule called 
projection rule is used to obtain derived readings for these constituents. On 
reflection, it should be expected that the projection rule cannot function 
properly if only the lexical readings are provided since two sentences which 
are composed ofthe same lexical items, which have the same readings, may 
have different meanings if the constituents are in different grammatical 
relations. For example, “John hates Mary" is not synonymous to "Mary 
hates John". Nevertheless, this requirement for the proper function of the 
projection rule is assured by the fact that the inputs to the semantic 
component are underlying phrase markers which are tailor-made to provide 
the grammatical information needed. 
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Following Katz[19], the process of forming and assigning semantic 
representations can be described as follows: 
The underlying phrase marker(s) of a sentence will be input to the 
semantic component of a grammar, which is composed of a dictionary and a 
projection rule. First, the dictionary will assign a set of lexical readings to 
each lexical item of the sentence, by associating each terminal symbol ofan 
underlying phrase marker withjust those lexical readings from its dictionary 
entry that are compatible with its syntactic description in the phrase marker. 
This association is accomplished by the following convention: 
(1.20) The set oflexical readings R is associated with the terminal element D 
ofthe underlying phrase marker Ujust in case D was introduced into 
U by (1.17) from the lexicon entry [D [C ]] and R is paired with 
[D [C ]] in the dictionary. 
Second, the projection rule will combine lexical readings, then the derived 
readings that result from such combinations, and so on, until a set ofreadings 
is associated with each constituent of the sentence, including the whole 
sentence itsetf. An underlying phrase marker each of whose constituents is 
assigned a set of readings by such a process will be referred to as a 
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semantically interpreted underlying phrase marker. These combinations 
will be made only in case constituents are grammatically related. The type of 
combination is determined by the type of grammatical relation obtaining 
between the constituents whose readings are to be combined. 
1.1.2 Selection Restrictions 
This process of combination must also weed out readings, tfwe count 
the number of senses that the lexical items of an ordinary fifteen- or 
twenty-word sentence has and compute the number of possible 
combinations that can be formed from them when they are paired up in 
accord with the grammatical relations of the sentence, the number of 
possible senses ofthe sentence runs into the hundreds. Since no sentence of 
a natural language has anywhere near this number of senses, and some have 
none at all, there must be a rather severe form of selection going on in the 
process ofproducing derived readings. 
Here we can make use of some traditional ideas about 
meaninglessness from philosophy. Since Aristotle, it has been recognized 
that concepts fall into categories and that the category of a concept specifies 
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the other concepts with which it can combine to assert something of some 
object in its range of predication. Thus, if, by virtue of the flexibility of 
syntax, a concept is combined with one outside its category, the sentence 
which puts them into combination will be conceptually absurd, or 
meaningless. Hence，to reconstruct such selection, we have to build this 
notion of category into the representations oflexical senses. 
Let's examine the adjective “waterproof’. Saying that something is 
waterproof means that water cannot pass through its surface to the inside. 
Since a surface is the exterior of a physical object, the concept of a physical 
object is the category of the concept waterproof. Now the category in which 
an object must fall in order for a concept to be predicated of it will appear 
among the concepts in the definition of the word that refers to the object. 
Therefore, it will be natural to reconstruct the selectional feature by requiring 
that nouns modified by "waterproof have the semantic marker (physical 
object) in their readings. H* this semantic marker is absent, the reading of 
"waterproof cannot combine with the reading of its nominal head to form a 
reading for the higher constituent of which this adjective and this nominal 
head are parts. Thus the requirement is to be formulated within the lexical 
reading ofthe adjective “waterproof, and stated as a restriction on the class 
of senses with which the sense of"waterproof' can combine to form others. 
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These requirements are called selection restrictions. They are found 
in abnost all lexical readings. We may also think of this feature of a lexical 
reading as reconstructing the different ranges of application of the different 
senses of the same lexical item. For instance，the word “handsome’，has one 
sense where it means something like "beautiful with dignity", another where 
it means something like “gracious or generous", and still another where it 
means something like “moderately large". The first of these senses applies to 
persons and artifacts, the second to conduct, and the third to amounts. 
Therefore, the expressions "handsome man", "handsome introduction" and 
"handsome loan，，differ appropriately in meaning. For example, the first of 
the three senses of "handsome" would be represented by a reading with a 
selection restriction ofthe form < (Human) V (Artifact) >, the second by one 
with a selection restriction ofthe form < (Conduct) >, and the third by one 
with a selection restriction ofthe form < (Amount) >. The &st can combine 
only with readings that contain either the semantic marker O^uman) or 
(Artifact), the second only with readings that contain (Conduct), and the 
third only with readings that contain (Amount). Thus because the reading of 
“desk，，contains the semantic marker (Artifact) but not (Conduct) or 
(Amount), a construction such as “handsome desk，，will only receive a 
reading representing it to mean a desk with beauty and dignity. There will be 
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no representation of it as meaning one that is gracious or one that is 
moderately large, for these conceptually incongruous senses will be selected 
out. 
Given selection restrictions, the projection rule will only produce 
derived readings that represent real senses of the constituents to which they 
are assigned. Assuming that the projection rule works from the bottom to the 
top of a phrase marker, from the syntactically minimal to the syntactically 
maximal constituents of a sentence, the derived readings assigned to its 
constituents reflect their compositional senses. The result of the operation of 
the projection rule will be a pairing of a set of readings with each node ofthe 
phrase marker, where the readings in the set represent the senses of the 
constituent dominated by the node. 
1.2.3 Definition of Semantic Properties & Relations 
The formal features ofthe semantic representation suggest some ways 
to formally reconstruct commonsense definitions of semantic properties and 
relations. The following shows some examples of how commonsense 
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definitions are replaced by ones stated in terms of formal features of 
semantic representations: 
(1.21) A constituent is semantically unique just in case it has exactly one 
reading in the set assigned to it. 
(1.22) A constituent is semantically ambiguous (n-ways) just in case the set 
of readings assigned to it has n members, n > 1. 
(1.23) A constituent Ci is (on one sense) synonymous with another Cj just 
in case the set of readings assigned to Ci and Cj have a member in 
common, ff a pair of constituents meeting this condition are 
sentences, then they are paraphrases (on a sense). 
(1.24) A constituent Ci is fully synonymous with another Cj just in case the 
set ofreadings assigned to Ci and Cj is identical, tf a pair of 
constituents meeting this condition are sentences, then they are Ml 
paraphrases. 
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(1.25) A constituent Ci is semanticaUy distinct from another Cj just in case 
the sets of readings assigned to them have no common members. 
(1.26) A constituent Ci is semanticaUy similar to another Cj just in case the 
sets of readings assigned to them have a proper subset in common. Ci 
and Cj are thus semanticaUy similar with respect to the concepts 
represented by the semantic markers in this proper subset. 
(1.27) A constituent Ci is semanticaUy included in another Cj (with respect 
to a sense of each) just in case every semantic marker in a reading of 
Ci also appears in a reading of Cj but that reading of Cj contains 
some semantic markers not in the given reading of Ci. 
(1.28) A constituent is semanticaUy anomalous just in case the set of 
readings assigned to it is empty. 
(1.29) A constituent C is semanticaUy redundant in the sentence S just in 
case the reading of C in the semanticaUy interpreted underlying 
phrase marker of S has been formed from a reading of a modifier cl 
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and a reading of its head c2 and the reading of cl contains only 
semantic markers appearing in the reading of c2. 
The semantic interpretation of a particular underlying phrase marker 
is its semantically interpreted underlying phrase marker together with all the 
statements that follow from this semantically interpreted underlying phrase 
marker and the definitions of semantic properties and relations in semantic 
theory. The semantic interpretation of a sentence S is the set ofsemantically 
interpreted underlying phrase markers associated with S together with the 
set of statements about S that follow from them and the definitions of 
semantic properties and relations in semantic theory. 
1.3 Status 
After the somewhat detailed presentation in the two essential aspects 
of linguistic theory in the two subsections above, our attention should be 
drawn to the questions: What actually does a grammar intend to achieve? 
What phenomena does it intend to explain? What is the cognitive status of it? 
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By what method(s) is it constructed? From what sources does it draw its 
plausibility (if any)? The answers to these questions are vital for our 
understanding of Katzian theory. 
1.3.1 Appearance-Reality Distinction 
Katz emphasized an appearance-reality distinction. He took the case 
of contrast between the following two views as his paradigm. One is the old 
commonsense view that as judged by direct experience, the matter ofwhich 
ordinary objects are formed appears continuous. The other is the 
Democritean theory of matter which postulates that matter consists of 
discrete atoms although it seems not to be supported by direct experience. 
Katz wrote, 
“The Democritean concept of matter originated as a purely 
hypothetical postulation. biitially, it could only have seemed the most 
extravagant of fancies. It proposed to populate the universe with 
unbelievably many new objects. Such objects were, moreover, supposed to 
be invisible and yet to provide the true understanding of visible phenomena. 
Finally, to add insult to injury, the concept flew in the face of the plain 
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testimony of sense experience. But when it proved to yield better predictions 
and explanations of the observable behavior of physical objects and 
substances than the concept of continuity, it received scientific acceptance. 
The continuity hypothesis, which once must have seemed the last word in 
sober science, became relegated to the status of a depiction of 
appearance”[20: 
This forms a model of the appearance-reality distinction. It is natural 
then to ask: How can the appearance-reality distinction be applied in 
linguistics? The answer is akeady indicated in the two subsections above; 
the surface-deep structure distinction correspond to the appearance-reality 
distinction. Surface structure is what appears in or what can be obtained 
from the observable utterances of speakers. Deep structure is another level 
ofreality that escapes direct observation. But escape from observation is one 
thing, existence is another. So in where does this level of reality exist? The 
taxonomic grammarians do not mention this level of reality. For them, all the 
reality oflanguage appears in the utterances of speakers and these mark the 
range ofconcem oftheirjobs. The hint for the deep structure comes from an 
examination ofthe remarkable properties oflanguage. 
33 
1.3.2 Linguistic Competence 
Katz expressed the view that “the most remarkable fact about human 
speech communication is that, except for cliches and bits ofsocial ritual like 
‘How do you do?,, the sentences we speak and hear daily are new sentences 
which bear little or no physical resemblance to familiar ones. Yet we 
understand abnost every new sentence we encounter and our understanding 
is immediate. This is in striking contrast to our attempts at understanding 
newmachines or gadgets，which often take considerable time and effort, and 
sometimes never succeed at all. Linguistic competence is the source ofthe 
creativity that makes such understanding possible, and the way this 
creativity operates suggests two principles to the transformationalist. First, 
the speaker's internalized rules must recursively generate each of the 
infmitely many sentences of his language, so that a new sentence, though 
new in the sense that no utterance of it has yet occurred, is not new in the 
sense ofbeing outside the set of sentences defmed by these rules. Second, 
these rules must embody a general function for associating the phonetic 
representation of acoustic signals with their meaning. Thus, it is this 
ftttiction, operating in the generation of sentences, that makes immediate 
understanding ofnew sentences possible."[21] 
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So Katz thought that there are some internalized rules and structures 
in our brains that enable us to do all these and these rules and structures are 
the deep structure of language. So when we study the underlying reality of 
language, we are at the same time studying the linguistic competence of 
speakers. Afterall, natural languages are invention of human mind, if they 
have any deep structure, this deep structure should be revealed by examining 
how people are able to taUc. 
For Katz, in transformational theory, "a grammar is conceived ofas a 
theory that explains how speakers can associate acoustic signals with the 
meaning those signals have in the language, a theory similar in form to 
theories in other sciences that explain a body of data by showing that it can 
be deduced from general principles about the structure of objects which 
provide the reason why the facts are as they are ，the model on which 
the transformational grammarian bases his is a theory like the atomic theory. 
Accordingly, on the transformationalist conception, a grammar is a theory 
about the system of linguistic rules that speakers have internalized in the 
process of acquiring a language 
Just as the physicist distinguishes between the nature of matter and its 
observable behavior, so the transformationalist distinguishes between the 
speaker's linguistic competence (the internalized rules that he knows) and 
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his linguistic performance (what he does on the basis of knowing such 
rules). A grammar, then, is a theoretical statement of what speakers know 
about the inherent structure of their language, and thus of their linguistic 
competence rather than their linguistic performance, though linguistic 
performance provides all the empirical data for the investigation of 
competence."[22] 
Furthermore, he said that this implies that "grammars must receive a 
mentalistic interpretation. For if the underlying reality of language 
determines the surface form of sentence structure and is itsetfidentified with 
the competence of speakers, the principles of grammar that describe the 
,i •. 
I underlying reality and its transformational relation to the shape ofutterances 
must describe something that is mental or conceptual in some sense. 
There is no reason to take mentalism in this way. We can 
instead take it to be an interpretation of grammars on which they offer an 
hypothesis about the mechanism inside the heads of fluent speakers that 
contains the principles of sound-meaning correlation which are applied in 
the production and recognition of speech. The hypothesis itsetfneed not be 




He supposed that the linguist constructs a theory by postulating the 
features of the mechanism underlying linguistic communication. The 
linguist's inference starts from postulating a mechanism of which the 
observable events oflinguistic communication are causal consequences. The 
linguist invents a theory about the structure of this mechanism and the causal 
chain connecting the mechanism to observable events, to explain how these 
internal causes produce linguistic communication as their effect. But it is 
clear that the linguist, though he claims that his theory describes a 
neurological mechanism, cannot immediately translate the theory into 
neurological terms. He then said, 
"But, this failure to have a ready neurological translation means 
only that he cannot yet specify what kind of physical realization of his 
theoretical description is inside the speaker's head The critical 
distinction is，then, between an abstract, formal characterization oflinguistic 
structure——the theory itsetf---— and a physical system of some kind which 
instances this structure. Discovering what kind of a physical system in the 
human brain instantiates the representation of structure given by a linguistic 
theory is the task ofthe neurophysiologist. The linguist's task is to provide a 
theory which represents the structure that any physical system must possess 
ifit is to be capable oflinguistic communication as we know it."[24] 
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1.3.3 Idealization 
It can be seen from above that a transformational grammar aims at the 
linguistic competence of speakers. The abstract mechanism inside the head 
of speakers that makes people capable of speaking is what it concerns. Li 
the following, Katz emphasized the role of idealization in a grammar: 
“It is crucial to make explicit that we do not take the grammar that 
linguists write for a natural language to be the description of what actual 
speakers have in their heads. Rather, we take grammars to be idealizations of 
actual cases in much the same sense in which perfectly rigid rods, perfect 
vacuums, and frictionless planes are. Thus, a grammar can best be taken to 
be a theory ofthe competence of an ideal speaker whose knowledge ofthe 
language is perfect. This idealization from the imperfect knowledge ofreal 
speakers is, then, motivated by the same considerations that make it 
necessary to introduce ideal objects into physics and other sciences, namely, 
formulating the principles and laws of a science in terms of ideal objects and 
systems, instead of actual ones, enable theories in that science to disregard 
extraneous factors and thereby to provide simpler and more revealing 
accounts of the relations that determine the phenomena. Thus just as the 
idealization of a frictionless plane enables physical theory to disregard 
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firictional differences in its formulation oflaws of motion, so the idealization 
of a perfectly fluent speaker enables linguistic theory to disregard accidental 
performance differences, such as incomplete linguistic knowledge, memory 
limitations, etc.，in its formulation of rules of grammar. 
Construing grammars as idealizations of actual speakers enables us to 
adopt a mentalistic interpretation of grammars without identifying 
phonological objects such as phonemes or features, syntactic objects such as 
nouns，verbs, phrases，etc., or semantic objects such as senses or meanings 
with particular aspects ofthe mental apparatus in the minds or brains ofreal 
speakers or communities of them. This is particularly important at the 
semantic level because of the general tendency to suppose that senses or 
meanings are psychological objects, that they are ideas or thoughts or kinds 
ofideas or thoughts. Butjust as we can distinguish at the level ofphonology 
and syntax between an utterance and a sentence, so here we can distinguish 
between a thought or idea and a meaning. Ideas, thoughts, cognitions, etc., 
like utterances, are performance phenomena, while meanings, like 
phonological features and syntactic categories, are abstractions that form 
part of competence."[25] 
He then adopted Frege's saying that when someone fu:st apprehends a 
Gedanke he comes to stand in a certain relation to something that akeady 
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exists. "Such considerations carry over to the distinction between meanings 
and thoughts, ideas, etc., quite easily if one understands all elements of 
linguistic competence as aspects of an idealization representing the perfect 
knowledge of an ideal speaker, as an abstraction from the actual knowledge 
ofreal speakers. The actual speakers' knowledge of the meaning ofwords 
and sentences is, then, an imperfect facsimile of their meaning in the 
language, which is given by an idealized grammar."[26] 
hi these two quotations, Katz expressed the view that what a grammar 
actually taUcs about is an ideal speaker. This is, in effect, just to tell the 
readers that some idealizations are made during theory construction. This is 
a usual practice in empirical sciences. 
1.3.4 Linguistic Description 
For Katz, there are three fundamental questions with which a 
synchronic description of a particular language deals and they are: 
(1) What is known by a speaker who is fluent in a natural language? 
That is, what facts about his language underlie his ability to communicate 
with others in that language? 
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(2) How is such linguistic knowledge put into operation to achieve 
communication? That is, how does a speaker use such linguistic knowledge 
to convey his thoughts, opinions, wishes, demands, questions, emotions, and 
so on to other speakers? 
(3) How do speakers come to acquire this ability? That is，what innate 
dispositions and developmental processes are responsible for transforming a 
non-verbal infant into a fluent speaker? 
He commented on these three questions as follows: 
“An answer to (1) may be referred to as a 'linguistic description'. A 
linguistic description has three components: syntactic, phonological, and 
semantic [the subsequent description is essentially an abstract ofwhat 
Ihave presented in section 1.1 and 1.2] 
An answer to (2) consists of at least two procedures. One is a 
‘sentence recognition procedure', whose ftmction is to assign to any given 
perceived utterance a phonetic representation, a syntactic description, and a 
semantic interpretation. The fimction of the other procedure is to choose an 
appropriate syntactic structure for any message that the speaker wishes to 
communicate and to provide a phonetic representation for that structure; it is 
a 'sentence production procedure'. Together, the two procedures determine 
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how the knowledge of the language embodied in the linguistic description is 
used by a speaker to understand and produce sentences. 
An answer to (3) is a theory of language acquisition. Such a theory 
explains how a nonverbal infant who is exposed in the normal way to a 
samples of sentences and nonsentences, and perhaps other data as well, 
comes to possess a linguistic description and procedures of sentence 
recognition and sentence production. 
The first ofthe three questions is logically prior to the others. We must 
know what linguistic facts a speaker knows before we can say how those 
facts enable him to communicate and before we can say how he acquired 
them: Linguistic description must precede inquiry into the nature oflanguage 
use and acquisition. But this logical priority does not mean that the attempt 
to answer (2) and (3) must wait for a full answer to (1); rather, it means that 
substantive contributions toward an answer to (1) must be available in order 
that attempts to answer (2) and (3) can begin. Furthermore, it means-—--and 
this is critical——that the kind of answer that will be given, or sought, for (2) 
and (3) is determined by the kind of answer which is given or sought for (1). 
Since (2) is, in the same sense，logically prior to (3)，the same applies to 
these two."[27] 
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We thus see that a transformational grammar is taken to be a theory of 
linguistic description. That is, an attempt to answer question (1). For the 
linguistic description of a natural language, Katz took it as an attempt to 
reveal the nature ofafluent speaker's mastery of that language. This mastery 
is manifested in the speaker's ability to communicate with other speakers of 
the language: to produce appropriate sentences that convey information, ask 
questions，give commands, etc.，and to understand the sentences of other 
speakers. "Thus a linguistic description must reconstruct the principles 
underlying the ability of speakers to communicate with one another. Such a 
reconstruction is a scientific theory whose statements represent the linguistic 
structure characteristic ofthe language and whose deductive consequences 
enable the linguist to explain sentence use and comprehension in terms of 
features of this structure."[28] 
1.3.5 Evidence 
The above analysis should make clear that a transformational 
grammar was taken to be a scientific theory like physics which utilizes the 





a hypothetical structure should be the immediate issue that suggests itself. 
j 




actually has such hypothetical structure which is beyond direct observation. 
！ Li physics or other empirical sciences, empirical evidence that relies on the 
sensory faculties ofhuman is the mean for confirmation. The combination of 
^ a physical theory consisting of abstract theoretical structure as well as some 
B 
: auxiliary hypotheses such as the particular initial setting of the system can 
1 
I . 
j deduce some observable consequences which can then be checked against •j 
I actual observation. The agreement of such predictions and actual � 
1 
observations confirms the hypothetical structure to some extent. What about 
the issue of confirmation for a transformational grammar? For this, he held 
that the construction of a grammar consists of an empirical investigation into 
language and so empirical evidence is what it needs. He wrote, 
“To determine the empirical evidence in favor of a grammar and 
1 
decide ifthe grammar is the best choice on the available evidence, we must 
i . . 
j compare what it predicts about the phonological, syntactic, and semantic 
i i 
properties and relations of the sentences in the corpus, with what fluent 
speakers of the language say about their phonological, syntactic, and 
semantic properties and relations. The set of suchpredictions that a grammar 
makes about a sentence is its linguistic description. The intuitivejudgments 
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of fluent speakers constitute the empirical phenomena to be predicted by 
•j 
j linguistic descriptions. To illustrate this, consider the following examples: 




(3.1) Peter Piper picked a peck of pickled peppers 
i 








(3.4) what did Peter Piper pick? , 
I 
I 
Fluent speakers of English will make the following sorts of intuitive 
i 
judgments about these cases: 
1 « 
(i) The whole of (3.1) is a sentence of the language, but (3.2) is not. 
(ii) "Peter Piper," "a peck of pickled peppers," and “tongue twisters” are 
constituents ofthe same type, as contrasted with “picked,，，“a,” and “of” 
(iii) Nonetheless, "Peter Piper" and “pickled peppers" differ from each other 
in just the way that "New York" and "metropolis" do. 
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(iv) "Peter Piper" in (3.1) is related to “picked” in that sentence in the same 
way that “tongue twisters" is related to “flabbergast” in (3.3). 
(v) (3.1) is related to (3.4) but not to (3.3). 
Facts such as (i)-(v) must somehow be stated in the linguistic descriptions 
that the rules ofthe grammar assign to sentences such as (3.1)-(3.4)."[29] 
Moreover he said that the semantic interpretation ofa sentence S is 
the set of semantically interpreted underlying phrase markers associated 
with S together with the set of statements about S that follow from them and 
the definitions of semantic properties and relations in semantic theory. These 
statements about the semantic properties and relations ofa sentence play a 
fundamental role in the empirical confirmation of a semantic component ofa 
transformational grammar, for they comprise the predictions that the 
component makes about the data. He continued, 
"Accordingly, the evidence for a semantic component consists in 
statements that correctly predict which sentences speakers judge to be 
semantically anomalous, which they judge to be semantically ambiguous, 
which theyjudge to be synonymous, and so forth, tfcertain statements in the 
semantic interpretation of a sentence prove false, then the semantic 
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component must be revised appropriately; and if there are semantic 
properties and relations that speakers attribute to a sentence but that are not 
predicted by any of the statements in its semantic interpretation, then the 
semantic component must be suitably extended. Hence the empirical 
investigation of the semantics of a natural language is no different in 
principle from that of other phenomena in other sciences，for in semantics 
also, a hypothesis about an underlying reality obtains its empirical 
justification from success in predicting and explaining publicly accessible 
data on the basis of its hypothesis about the structure of the underlying 
reality."[30] 
Accordingly, we see that intuitivejudgments of fluent speakers about 
linguistic properties and relations of sentences constitute the empirical data 
to which the predictions of a grammar must correspond in order that it can be 
confirmed. 
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2. Atomic Physics 
Li this section, in order to prepare the second half ofthe materials on 
which the comparison on the next section is based, we are going to study two 
elementary topics of atomic physics. The first topic concerns the line spectra 
ofhydrogen atom, while the other involves Bohr's theory ofhydrogen atom. 
Although this theory is very out-dated, its essential features are still suitable 
for our comparison. The relevancy of these two topics for our use will be 
shown in section 3. 
2.1 Line Spectra ofHydrogen Atom[31] 
It had very early been shown that white light can be decomposed into 
separate colours by dispersion with a prism. This indicates that white light is 
made up of lights ofvarious frequencies. It was later shown that light from 
incandescent gas consists of a large number of discrete frequencies called 
“emission lines"[32] • Subsequently, it was discovered that atoms exposed to 
white light can only absorb light at certain discrete frequencies called 
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"absorption lines” Afterwards, it was shown by G. R. Kirchoff that only 
certain definite frequencies can be radiated or absorbed by a given element 
and that the emission frequencies coincide with the absorption frequencies. 
This means that each element has its own characteristic Une spectrum. 
The most important discovery in the search for regularities in the line 
spectra ofatoms was made by J. Bahner, who showed that the frequencies of 
a series of lines in the visible part of the spectrum of atomic hydrogen were 
among those given by the empirical formula: 
(2.1) Vy = R ( l W - l / n / ), 
where ni = 1, 2, 3,..…；nj = 2，3，4,..…；nj > ni； 
Vy being the frequency of either an emission or absorption line; 
R = Rydberg's constant. 
It was subsequently discovered that Bahner's formula is not only applicable 
to the visible region, but in fact describes the complete spectrum of atomic 
hydrogen. 
In atomic hydrogen, the series of lines with 巩=1 is known as the 
"Layman series" and Ues in the ultra-violet part of the spectrum. The Bahner 
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series (n! = 2) lies in the visible region. Further series oflines are found in the 
infra-red part of the spectrum: the Paschen series 0¾ = 3). The next two are 
the Brackett series for ni = 4 and the Pfund series for ni = 5. 
2.2 Bohr's Theory ofHydrogen Atom 
N. Bohr combined the concepts of Rutherford's nuclear atom, 
Planck's quanta and Einstein's photons to explain the observed spectrum of 
atomic hydrogen. He assumed that the electron in an atom moved in an orbit 
about the nucleus under the influence of the electrostatic attraction of the 
nucleus. Circular or elliptical orbits are allowed by classical mechanics, and 
Bohr elected to consider circular orbits for simplicity. He then postulated 
that instead ofthe infinity oforbits which are possible in classical mechanics, 
only a certain set of stable orbits, which he called “stationary states", are 
allowed. As a result, atoms can only exist in certain allowed energy levels, 
with energies Ei, Ej, Ek, 
Bohr further postulated that an electron in a stable orbit does not 
radiate electromagnetic energy, and that radiation can only take place when 
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a transition is made between the allowed energy levels. To obtain the 
frequency of the radiation, he made use of the idea that the energy of 
electromagnetic radiation is quantized and carried by photons, each photon 
associated with the frequency v carrying an energy hv, where h is the 
Planck's constant. Thus，ifaphoton of frequency v is absorbed by an atom, 
conservation of energy requires that 
(2.2) hv = ^ - ^ , 
where Ei and Ej are the energies ofthe atom in the initial and fmal orbits, with 
Ej > Ei. Similarly, ifthe atom passes from a state of energy Ej to another state 
of lower energy Ei, the frequency of the emitted photon must be given by the 
Bohr frequency relation (2.2). 
For the case of the hydrogen atom Bohr was able to modify the 
classical planetary model to obtain the quantization of energy levels by 
making the additional postulate that the angular momentum of the electron 
moving in a circular orbit can only take one of the values L = nh/27T, where n 
is a positive integer, n 二 1，2, 3,..…The allowed energy levels can then be 
determined in the following way. 
51 
We shall make the approximation that the nucleus is mfmitely heavy 
compared with the bound electron and is therefore at rest. The electron will 
be taken to be moving in a circular orbit of radius r，in which case the 
Coulomb attractive force acting on the electron, due to its electrostatic 
interaction with the nucleus of charge e, can be equated with the electron 
mass m times the centripetal acceleration (v^/r): 
(2.3) eV (47csr^ ) = mv /^ r, 
where 8 = a constant characterizing some properties ofthe surrounding 
medium, 
V = speed of the electron. 
A second equation is obtained from Bohr's postulate that the orbital angular 
momentum is quantized: 
(2.4) L = mvr = nh/27i, n = l , 2 , 3 , . . … 
From (2.3) and (2.4), we obtain the possible values ofv and r: 
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(2.5) Vn = eV(2shn), 
(2.6) r^ = shV/ (716½), 
The kinetic energy T of the electron is then found to be 
(2.7) Tn = mvn2/ 2 = me” 8(hsn)^ 
and the potential energy V is, correspondingly, 
(2.8) Vn = -e2/(47isrn) = -me4/4(hsn)2, 
from which the total energy En of the system is 
(2.9) En=Tn + Vn = -ma(hsn)2. 
Using the Bohr frequency relation (2.2), the frequencies oflight emitted in a 
transition between two levels i andj are 
(2.10) vy = [me4/(8s2h3)]( Mn^  - l/n/ ), nj > ni 
in agreement with the empirical formula (2.1) where R is chosen to be 
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(2.11) R = meV(8s^^) 
Here the theoretical value ofRis in good agreement with that obtained from 
experiment. Hence the Bohr's theory of atom provided a theoretical 
explanation for the observed line spectra ofhydrogen. 
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3. Criticisms ofKatzian Semantics as Compared with 
Atomic Physics 
At the beginning of one of his books {The Underlying Reality of 
Language and Its Philosophical Imporf), Katz examined the case of the 
success ofDemocritean theory of matter over the non-Democritean theory. 
The former theory claims that matter is constituted of discrete particles, 
while the latter theory adopts the view that matter is continuous. He 
expressed admiration about the Democritean theory by saying, 
"The Democritean concept of matter originated as a purely 
hypothetical postulation. L:iitially, it could only have seemed the most 
extravagant of fancies. It proposed to populate the universe with 
unbelievably many new objects. Such objects were, moreover, supposed to 
be invisible and yet to provide the true understanding of visible phenomena. 
Finally, to add insult to injury, the concept flew in the face of the plain 
testimony of sense experience. But when it proved to yield better predictions 
and explanations of the observable behavior of physical objects and 
substances than the concept of continuity, it received scientific acceptance. 
The continuity hypothesis, which once must have seemed the last word in 
sober science, became relegated to the status of a depiction of 
appearance."[33] 
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Katz then said that this case will be taken as the paradigm with 
respect to which we shall study language. He said, 
“ the case of the atomic theory is a sound paradigm for linguistic 
theory. Thus, we shall argue that natural languages have an underlying 
reality very different from their surface form. We shall try to show that this 
underlying reality can be discovered and substantiated by essentially the 
same method of hypothetical postulation and empirical verification that 
established the explanatory superiority of the atomic theory."[34] 
These quotations illustrate the motivation behind my thesis. A 
criticism of Katzian semantic theory with reference to the Bohr theory of 
hydrogen atom will be carried out. The latter theory possesses the essential 
ingredients because ofwhich atomic theory can be taken as the paradigm for 
Katz，theory, namely, that it was successfully constructed by the method of 
hypothetical postulation and empirical confirmation. Through this study, it 
will be shown that, due to the fact that there are some crucial conditions 
which the central theoretical constructs of the Katzian theory cannot satisfy, 
the theory is suffered from serious defects concerning prediction, 
explanation, confirmation and interpretation. 
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3.1 Distinction between Linguistic Theory & Linguistic 
Descriptions 
Linguistic theory and linguistic descriptions are two distinct but 
interrelated parts oflinguistic studies. It is necessary to make the distinction 
between these two studies clear so as not to confuse the subject of our 
discussion. First ofall, let's look at some explanations from Katz: 
"Synchronic linguistics involves two distinct but interrelated studies: 
a study ofthe diversity in forms oflinguistic communication and a study of 
the limits of such diversity. Li the former，linguists investigate what is unique 
about individual natural languages and formulate such facts in what are 
called linguistic descriptions (or generative grammars). In the later, 
linguists investigate what is common to all natural languages and formulate 
these more general facts about language in linguistic theory:'[35] 
“....,linguistic theory is a specification of the universals oflanguage, 
the principles of organization and interpretation that are invariant from 
natural language to natural language. Linguistic theory expresses such 
invariants in the form of a model of a linguistic description, ofwhich each 
empirically successful linguistic description must be an instance, 
exemplifying every aspect of the model. Particular linguistic descriptions 
account for the diverse ways in which different natural languages realize the 
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abstract structural pattem displayed in the model, while the model itsetf 
describes the form of a system of empirical generalizations capable of 
expressing and organizing the facts about a natural language."[36] 
From the presentation ofKatz' semantic theory in section 1，it should 
be clear that Katz,s theory is intended to be a linguistic theory since it is 
actually intended to be a theory of the linguistic universals of natural 
languages. For instance, it assumes that every natural language utilizes 
semantic markers for semantic representation. Hence, it should be noted that 
our concem in this paper is about a linguistic theory oflinguistic universals 
of natural languages and not about a linguistic description of a particular 
language. It is easy to confuse these two studies because they are closely 
related in the aspects of object of study and method of reserach. 
3.2 Theoretical Constructs in Katz，theory 
The central difficulty associated with Katz' theory is that its 
theoretical notions are only associated with some unclear ideas. For 
instance，the notion of semantic markers stands for something that are used 
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for representing conceptual components or the notion of projection rules 
stands for something that utilize the traditional principle of compositionality 
for combining senses. I do not mean that Katz' actual characterization of 
these notions is as unclear as the characterization I have just provided. But 
his characterization is in fact not much better, for the theoretical notions of 
his theory is devoid of something that are most vital for contributing to their 
meanings——empirical connections. Empirical connections for the 
theoretical notions are both theoretically and practically important. 
Theoretically, interpretation and confirmation of theory depend on them; 
practically, explanation and prediction of phenomena depend on them. 
In Katz' theory, there are theoretical concepts like "semantic 
marker”，“reading”，"projection rule", "selection restriction”，“dictionary”， 
etc. These notions are interrelated. For instance, a reading “will consist ofa 
set of symbols which we call semantic markers, and a complex symbol 
which we call a selection resMction”[31], or the dictionary may be 
regarded “as a fmite list of rules, called 'dictionary entries，’•.…” and a 
dictionary entry “is a word paired with n readings (for it)."[38]. 
However, it should be noted that all of them are newly invented 
notions. The interrelations among them do not help us understand any of 
them. What is needed is to have these terms being related to some terms 
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which are familiar to us. The issue mentioned here actually concerns the 
general problem of interpretation of theoretical terms in scientific theory. 
It seems to me that Katz has some misconceptions about how 
theoretical terms are being interpreted in scientific theory. For this, for 
instance, he said， 
“…,.a semantic marker is a theoretical construct which is intended to 
represent a concept that is part of the sense of morphemes and other 
constituents ofnatural languages. By a concept in this connection we do not 
mean images or mental ideas or particular thoughts……Concepts, on the 
other hand, are abstract entities. They do not belong to the conscious 
eiq)erience of anyone, though they may be thought about, as in our thinking 
about the concept of a circle."[39] 
So, semantic markers are taken to represent some abstract entities. 
Then the problem is shifted to: what are these abstract entities? For this, Katz 
continued, 
“This, however, still leaves open the question of what the ontological 
status of concepts and propositions is, of what kinds of things senses and 
meanings are. This question will be left here without a fmal answer. The 
reason is twofold. On the one hand,…,.On the other hand, even 
approximations to a serious solution cannot be developed until much more is 
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known about semantic structure. The situation is comparable to the question 
in physics of what light is. Fruitful investigation into the structure of a 
phenomenon does not presuppose a definite knowledge of what that 
phenomenon really is, but, quite the reverse, eventually learning what that 
phenomenon is presupposes an extensive knowledge ofits structure."[40] 
Katz then said something very problematic: "Just as MaxwelPs field 
theory explains many of the structural features of the propagation of 
light without explaining what light really is，so we can construct a 
semantic theory which explains the structure of complex meanings 
without resting this explanation on an ontological account of concepts 
and propositions."[41] Here what Katz meant by "Maxwell's field theory" 
is Maxwell's electromagnetic theory of light. How could he say that this 
theory has not explained what light really is? What sort of explanation did he 
want? He may have some misconceptions about how theoretical concepts 
are being explained in theory. So let's take a brief survey about this issue. 
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3.3 Theoretical Concepts & Correspondence Rules[42] 
Ideally speaking, in an empirical theory, there are, other than the 
logical and mathematical terms, two kinds of terms. One is called 
“theoretical terms" and the other is called “observation terms". The former 
kind of terms are foreign to us; they are newly invented terms and their 
meanings need explanation. “Electron，，，“quark，，，"gravitational field”， 
“photon” are instances oftheoretical terms. On the other hand, observation 
terms refer directly to observable properties so that we have a clear grasp of 
their meanings or uses. Examples for observation terms include “red’，， 
“hard”, "warm".[43] Now, while some theoretical terms may be explicitly 
defmed by other terms (theoretical or not), those which are called "primitive 
theoretical terms" can only be implicitly defmed by theoretical postulates (in 
which, other than logical and mathematical terms, only theoretical terms 
appear) as well as by certain relations connecting the theoretical and 
observation terms, which are called "correspondence rules" by Camap, 
“interpretative sentences" by Hempel, and "correlative definitions" by 
Reichenbach.[44] (For our discussion, the term “correspondence rules" will 
be adopted.) 
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Here the important thing is to note that the theoretical postulates 
impose logical relationships among the primitive theoretical terms. So the 
primitive theoretical terms are just abstract symbols in some abstract 
theoretical laws if they are not somehow made to relate to terms standing for 
observable properties. For example, what is the meaning of the term 
"electron"? Somebody may say that a electron is something negatively 
charged. But what is meant by “negatively charged"? Then reply, 
"Something being negatively charged is one that is charged but not 
positively charged” But what then is meant by "positively charged"?…,.tf 
we take more time to play this game of ask-and-answer with the restriction 
that no observation terms are allowed to use, then it will be seen that the 
outcome would be a network oflogical and mathematical relations involving 
only theoretical terms. Thus it is reasonable to suppose that the meanings of 
theoretical terms are ultimately explained by relating to some familiar 
observation terms. These connections among theoretical and observation 
terms are provided by correspondence rules. As a result, it is through this 
complicated network ofrelations that many theoretical terms are implicitly 
defined. These implicit definitions then provide the explanations for the 
meanings of these theoretical terms. 
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The confirmation, the prediction, as well as the explanatory ability of 
the theory rely on correspondence rules. The reason is very simple. Firstly, 
confirmation needs observational evidence. Secondly, prediction and 
explanation are prediction and explanation of observable phenomena. 
Hence, summing up，it is clear then why interpretation of theoretical terms 
and the other three aspects of a theory just mentioned have all to rely on 
correspondence rules. 
To illustrate the issue, let's take Bohr's theory ofhydrogen atom as 
sketched in section 2.2 for consideration. 
3.4 Bohr vs Katz: the Weakness of the Latter 
As stated in section 2.2, N. Bohr's theory of the hydrogen atom was 
devised in order to explain, among other things, experimental laws about the 
line spectra of the atomic hydrogen. According to the theory, as long as an 
electron remains in any one orbit, its energy remains constant and the atom 
emits no radiation. However, an electron may "jump" from an orbit with a 
higher energy level to an orbit with a lower energy level. When it does, the 
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atom emits an electromagnetic radiation, whose frequency v is a function of 
these energy differences and it is given by (2.2), namely: 
(2.2) hv = Ej-Ei, 
where Ei and Ej are the energies of the atom in the fmal and initial orbits, with 
Ej > Ei. 
Now, how is the Bohr theory brought into connection with what can 
be observed in the laboratory? On face value, the electron, its circulation in 
orbits, its jumps from orbits to orbits, and so on, are all notions that do not 
apply to anything manifestly observable. They arejust implicitly defined by 
the theoretical postulates. In order to make prediction and explanation of 
observable phenomena possible, connections must therefore be introduced 
between such theoretical notions and what can be identified by way of 
laboratory procedures. In fact, connections of this sort are made somewhat 
as follows. On the basis ofthe electromagnetic theory oflight, a line in the 
spectrum of an element is associated with an electromagnetic radiation 
whose wavelength can be calculated, in accordance with the assumptions of 
the theory, from experimental data on the position of the spectral line. On the 
other hand, the Bohr theory associates the wavelength (inversely 
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proportional to the frequency) of a light ray emitted by atom with thejump of 
an electron from one of its permissible orbits to another such orbit. Jn 
consequence, the theoretical notion of an electron jump is linked to the 
experimental notion of a spectral line. Once this and other similar 
correspondences are introduced, the experimental law concerning the series 
of lines occurring in the spectrum of an element can be deduced from the 
theoretical postulates about the transitions of electrons from their 
permissible orbits. 
At this point, the vital question should be: Are the theoretical notions 
ofKatzian semantics explicitly or implicitly defined by correspondence rules 
so that we can grasp their meanings and they can be made connected with the 
empirical ground? The above examination of the structure of the theory 
shows that they are neither explicitly defined, nor implicitly defined by 
correspondence rules. These foreign theoretical notions have not been made 
to connect with any familiar notions concerning linguistic phenomena. As a 
result, we cannot grasp the meanings of these notions and the theory is 
devoid ofthe ability ofpredicting and explaining linguistic phenomena. The 
theory therefore also cannot be confirmed. 
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Notes 
[1] From now on, unless otherwise specified, what I mean by "languages" 
are natural languages and, by "utterances of speakers”，the physically 
manifested strings of sound or of written marks. 
[2] J. J. Katz, The Underlying Reality of Language and its Philosophical 
Import (New York: Harper and Row, 1971)，p. 4. 
[3] For some short introductions to Katz' ideas, see, J. J. Katz and J. A. 
Fodor, "The Structure of a Semantic Theory." Language, Vol. 39 (April-
June 1963), pp. 170-210, reprinted in Katz, J. J. & Fodor, J. A., eds., The 
Structure of Language: Readings in the Philosophy of Language. 
Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964; also see J. J. Katz, “The 
Philosophical Relevance ofLinguistic Theory." The Joumal ofPMosophy, 
vol. 62 (1965), reprinted in R. Rorty, ed. The Linguistic Tum: Recent 
Essays in PhilosophicalMethod. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1967. 
[4] N. Chomsky, Syntactic Structures (The Hague: Mouton, 1957). 
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[5] N. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1965). 
[6] For example, see Allan, K., Linguistic Meaning Vol. 1. London & New 
York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986.; Fodor, J. D., Semantics: Theories of 
Meaning in Generative Grammar. The Havester Press, 1977. 
[7] This, as well as the subsequent notion of semantic marker, will be 
explained later. 
[8] Katz，The Underlying Reality of Language and its Philosophical Import, 
p. 50. 
[9] Ibid., p. 49. 
[10] Ibid., p. 58. 
[11]Ibid.,p. 64. 
[12] Ibid.，p. 64. 
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[13] Ibid., p. 65. 
[14] Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
[15] Ibid.，pp. 40-43. 
[16] Ibid., p. 56. 
[17] Ibid., p.57. 
[18]Ibid.,p.l01. 
[19]Ibid.,pp. 106-114. 
[20] Ibid., p, 3. 
[21] Ibid., pp. 52-53. 
[22] Ibid., pp. 50-52. 
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[23]Ibid.，pp. 118-119. 
[24] J. J. Katz, "Mentalism in Linguistics." Language, vol. 40, no. 2 (1964)， 
p. 129. 
[25] Katz，The Underlying Reality of Language and its Philosophical 
Import, pp. 120-121. 
[ 2 6 ] 脇 . , p . 122 . 
[27] Katz, "Mentalism in Linguistics.", pp. 130-131. 
[28] J. J. Katz and P. M. Postal, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic 
Descriptions (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964), p. 1. 
[29] Katz, The Underlying Reality of Language and its Philosophical 
Import, pp. 23-24. 
[30] Ibid., pp. 114-115. 
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[31] For more detailed exposition about the topics in this and the next 
sections, see, e.g. Kuhn, H. G., Atomic Spectra. 2nd Edition. London: 
Longman, 1970; H. A. Enge, M. R. Wehr and J. A. Richards, Introduction to 
Atomic Physics, (Addison-Wesley, 1972). 
[32] These are called "lines" because under certain conditions, atoms can be 
made to emit electromagnetic waves of various wavelengths which ,when 
passing through some apparatus such as a prism, can be made to separate 
and appear as observable lines on the screen. Each line corresponds to one 
wavelength. 
[33] Katz, The Underlying Reality of Language and its Philosophical 
Import, p. 3. 
[34] Ibid., p. 4. 
[35] J. J. Katz, “The Philosophical Relevance of Linguistic Theory” The 
joumal of Philosophy, Vol. 62 (1965), reprinted in R. Rorty, ed.，The 
Linguistic Tum: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method. (Chicago: The 
University ofChicago Press, 1967), p. 340. 
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[36] Ibid., p. 342. 
[37] J. J. Katz, The Philosophy ofLanguage. (New York: Harper & Row, 
1966), p. 154. 
[38] Ibid. p. 154. 
[39] J. J. Katz, Semantic theory Q^ewYork: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 38. 
[40] Ibid., p. 39. 
[41] Ibid., p. 39. 
[42] My discussion here involves some harmless simplifications of the 
situation. For detailed discussion of the structure of scientific theory, see, 
e.g., C.G. Hempel, The Philosophy ofNatural Science (Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966); F. Suppe, ed., The Structure of Scientific 
Theories. 2nd edition O^niversity ofIUinois Press, 1977). 
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[43] Here, it does not mean that the demarcation of theoretical terms and 
observation terms is clear-cut. It is just intended to give some typical 
examples for these two categories. 
[44] See, e.g., Hempel, The Philosophy ofNatural Science, pp. 98-100; also 
Camap, The Philosophical Foundations ofPhysics, Chap. XXIV. 
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